War in Ukraine: Initial view on Supply Chain Impact

BCG Global Advantage and Operations Practice Areas

Prepared: 10 March 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution
The war in Ukraine is above all a political and humanitarian crisis...

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to a serious humanitarian crisis. BCG condemns this attack and the violence that is killing, wounding, and displacing so many people.

The top priority in moments like these must be the safety and security of people. Corporates, governments, and non-for-profit organizations should focus on supporting the people in Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and globally affected (physically and mentally).

It is the duty of political, societal, and business leaders to navigate through this crisis. The intent of this document is to inform discussions on the supply chain impact of the war in Ukraine.

The situation surrounding Ukraine is dynamic and rapidly evolving - this document reflects information and analysis as of 10 March 2022. It is not intended as a prediction of future events and is shared only as a resource for BCG and client conversations.
War in Ukraine: Supply Chain Impact

AGENDA

Deep-dive: First view on Supply Chain Impact

- Current situation and context
  - Supply and cost impacts
  - Supply chains at risk
  - Implications for leaders
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus make up a small percentage of global trade but have an over indexed share of trade in Europe specifically.
Overview: Several major sectors impacted, with many supply chains at risk

Before war in Ukraine, global supply chains were under stress from COVID and geo-political events (e.g., Brexit, tariffs, etc.)

Supply chains at risk

Commodity shortages
Difficulty sourcing and/or higher prices for key commodities

Component/product sourcing challenges
Inability to source manufactured goods and inputs due to plant closure

Demand shocks
Slowdown in manufacturing / inability to import impacting exporters

Logistics
Rise of logistics costs due to capacity and fuel impact

Supply and cost impacts

Supply Chains impact varies across sectors. A few examples emerge:

• **Steel**: Supply risks in Europe due to disruptions of intermediate and finished steel products (e.g., pig iron, slabs)
• **Semiconductors**: Short supply especially of advanced chips exacerbated – main impact auto, industrial, electronics
• **Automotive**: Disruption of raw materials and component inputs – accelerate inventory shortages and rising global prices
• **Agribusiness**: Shortages (e.g. wheat, fertilizer) and increased transport costs likely to drive up commodity and food-goods prices

Implications for leaders

Short-term: Understand risks & impact, prioritize customers to protect; find alternative sources, rebalance global network

Mid-to-long term: Build in resilience & anticipate areas of exposure, elevate supply chain risk to C-suite, optimize global footprint, dual source, re-set supply chain buffers

Source: BCG experience and analyses
AGENDA

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- Implications for leaders
Raw Materials | Steel, Auto, and Agribusiness most impacted due to current or potential unavailability of supply from Russia and Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raw mat'l with high Russia, Ukraine, Belarus share</th>
<th>% of global exports</th>
<th>Top export markets</th>
<th>Industries primarily impacted</th>
<th>Sanctions as of 10 March 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Pig iron (nonalloy)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Anthracite coal</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Mar 8 ban import of Russian coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>Semifinished product of iron or steel</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uranium; Plutonium²</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potassium chloride fertilizer</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Agribusiness</td>
<td>Jan 7 ban imports from Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mineral or chemical fertilizers³</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Agribusiness</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Palladium</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cereals (wheat &amp; meslin)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Agribusiness</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aluminum (non-alloy)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nickel²</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Titanium²</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Aerospace</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural gas³</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Mar 8 ban import of Russian liq. nat. gas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Trade data from 2019; Based on HS6 level except for Nickel at HS4 level (7501,7502) Filtered for products w/export value >$1B; Where no value for BY or UA; <1% of global exports 1. Analysis based on HS6 codes: 270111, 720110, 284420, 720711,711021, 310520, 750230, 760110, 310420, 271121, 100199; 2. And its compounds 3. Mineral or chemical fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium; Russia indicated they might halt exports; 4. Excludes impact of indirect sanctions i.e., on financing, transport, and sanctions on individuals 5. HS6 level data (7501,7500) 6.Titanium on HS4 level (8108), OEC data 7. In gaseous state Source: USGS, FAO, UN Comtrade, EIA, OEC World, BCG Analysis, Web search

Deep dive to follow
Nickel | Stainless steel and battery production impacted lack of access to supply from Russia

### Top 5 exporters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of global exports</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russia’s top customers:

- EU 49%
- China 36%
- Japan 4%
- Korea 3%
- Others 20%

### Pricing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price (LME, $/Ton) and % impact on past 4 weeks</th>
<th>22,145</th>
<th>39,905</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept ‘21</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct ‘21</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov ‘21</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec ‘21</td>
<td></td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan ‘21</td>
<td></td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb ‘22</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar ‘22</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mar 8:** Trading halted as price reached 46,528 (>100k$/t)

### Industry impact

**1st order**

- **4,100kt SST supply at risk** (75% of EU production)
- **~90kt of import needed**, taking away from competitors

**2nd order**

- **Food & Bev industry** (820kt) with highest demand hit first; Chemical and Automotive also exposed
- **Increased competition** for secondary supply

**Stainless steel** (~70% of primary nickel)

- Lost supply, difficult to replace as demand increases
- Changing supplies decrease production efficiency short term

**Battery** (~10% of primary nickel; ~40% by 2040)

- Potential shortages for materials may delay EV3 industry growth
- Poor ESG footprint for substitutes from other regions (carbon-intensive)
- Localized supply chains down to mine-level in high demand

**Note:**

1. For Nickel HS4 codes (7501, 7502)
2. London Metal Exchange – in US$ per metric ton, price increase based on 4 wks avg trading price
3. Electric Vehicles
4. Source: Roskill; USGS; FAO; UN Comtrade; EIA; Nickel Association; Nickel Institute; Desk research; BCG analysis

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Industry impact

Corn and sunflower seeds not yet sown, **unclear if seeded wheat can be nurtured and harvested in Ukraine** — usual fertilizer applications at this time of season have mostly failed

Likelihood of **missed growing season** in Ukraine due to ongoing conflict, exodus of refugees

Sanctions not in place, but **Russian export ban possible and Black Sea exports impacted**

### 1st order

- **Wheat, sunflower, corn shortages** & higher prices
- **Pressure on reliant companies** to find other supplies
- **Higher prices for foods globally** (e.g., bread, with prices in Egypt rising 50% in 2 days after invasion)
- **Soy and meat prices to rise**, as sunflower meal production (animal feed) in Ukraine is disrupted

### 2nd order

- **Protectionist food policies**, with Hungary, Turkey and Argentina already increasing export control
- **Risk of social unrest**, in low food security nations (e.g., Lebanon)
- **Undernutrition**, in Global South (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa)
- **Substitutional goods** will see increased production (2023)

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**Russia and Ukraine exports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of global exports</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower meal</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower oil</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Top wheat customers**
- Egypt
- Lebanon
- Turkey
- India

**Pricing**

Price (MATIF, €/bu.) and % impact on past 4 weeks

- Wheat: 346 (Mar '22) vs 264 (Sept '21) +49%
- Corn: 397 (Mar '22) vs 252 (Sept '21) +53%

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Note: Pricing data as of Mar 7 2022 1. S&P Capital IQ (EUR per MT); 2. As reported by Bloomberg (here); 3. Southern Hemisphere


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**Agribusiness | Disruption of Russian & Ukrainian supply of wheat, corn, and sunflower supply impacting grain and feed markets**

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Fertilizer | Crop yields at risk due to potential shortage of Russian & Ukrainian fertilizer

Industry impact

Russian Trade Ministry urged halting fertilizer exports as of Mar. 04 2022

Prices have already increased (v. Oct ’21): Ammonia (+90%), Urea (+20%), DAP (+15%), & MOP³ (+75%)

Russian owned companies are key players in fertilizer market, so possibility for further industry disruptions in other fertilizer components (e.g., nitrates, phosphates, potassium compounds)

Reduced global fertilizer supply leading to higher prices

Pressure on companies reliant on Russian & Belarussian fertilizers to promptly find alternative supplies; however, few substitutes exist

Weakened Crop Yields in 2022-23 from under-fertilization and sowing fewer seeds

Prices of soaps, animal feeds & household cleaners will rise, as N/P/K⁴ are also part of cost base

Fertilizer trade-flow rebalancing: compounds flow to “friendly” countries to Russia

MENA⁵, Americas, & Canada to explore or expand local options and alternative sources of Nitrogen & Phosphorous (used in fertilizer)

Component sourcing & demand shocks | Supply and demand ripple effects created by companies stopping or limiting Russian & Ukrainian operations

Companies across industries stopping or limiting operations for component shortages or to protect personnel...

- **Auto**
  - Foreign OEMs (e.g., Hyundai¹, VW², Ford³) halting car production, import/export and servicing in Russian operations
  - Leoni AG⁴, Kromberg & Schubert⁵ and other global tier 1 & 2 suppliers closed Ukrainian plants (manufacturing in wire harnesses)

- **Food and beverages**
  - Consumer goods companies (e.g., Heineken⁶, Carlsberg⁷, Unilever⁸, Pernod Ricard⁹) suspended exports to Russia and/or Russian production
  - Consumer goods companies (e.g., AB InBeV¹⁰, Coca-Cola¹¹) shutdown beverage production in Ukraine

- **Chemicals/Pharma**
  - BASF¹² halted investment in new business and operations in Russia, except for production related to humanitarian efforts
  - Biosphere¹³ cut production of personal care products & biodegradable plastics in Ukraine

- **Aerospace**
  - Airbus¹⁴ suspended support services & supply of spare parts to Russian airlines; Boeing¹⁵ stopped procuring titanium from Russia

- **Foreign OEMs** (e.g., Hyundai¹, VW², Ford³) halting car production, import/export and servicing in Russian operations

…with two main effects for global supply chains

1. **Negative demand shock** on manufacturing inputs exported to Russia/Ukraine. Will cause *lost sales* for some suppliers and create sourcing opportunities for manufacturers outside of Russia/Ukraine

2. **Lack of supply** of key components and products for companies importing from Russia/Ukraine, impacting those importers’ ability to satisfy their customers’ demand

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1. KBS World (03/09) 2. WSJ (03/03) 3. Reuters (03/01) 4. WSJ (02/27) 5. Reuters (03/03) 6. NL Times (03/05) 7. Reuters (03/04) 8. Reuters (03/08) 9. The Times (03/07) 10. Fortune 11. Reuters (02/24) 12. Nasdaq (03/03) 13. Forbes (03/06) 14. BBC (03/02) 15. Reuters (03/07) Source: Press, web search, company announcements, BCG Analysis
Logistics | Global freight routes further distressed leading to reduced capacity and increased costs across industries

**AIR FREIGHT:** Rates approaching record highs (120% above pre-COVID)\(^1\)

Flight bans and sanctions to cause capacity loss in EU-Asia lane (21% of cargo) exacerbating capacity crunch. Portion will cancel vs re-route

Super-connector airlines in the Middle East may serve as a substitute\(^4\)

Jet fuel prices up 27% month over month\(^1\), likely to drive cargo rates up further

**SEA FREIGHT:** Moderate impact on capacity, significant risk from fuel

Congestion expected at northern EU ports to process 200 rerouted ships waiting to cross the Kerch Strait\(^2\)

Maersk, ONE, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd have suspended shipments to Russia & Ukraine\(^2\)

Bunker (marine fuel) up 84% vs. last year\(^3\), bunker is ~45% of vessel op costs; however, rates currently detached from container rates

**ROAD & RAIL:** China-EU railroad stopped & EU truck drivers shortages heightened

Disrupted China-EU railway - linking 24 countries & 264 cities, and intended alternative to global sea and air freight\(^4\)

Rail lines through Russia closed: Asian exporters need to find new routes to EU\(^5\)

Ukrainian truck drivers returning to the Ukraine exacerbating EU driver shortage (e.g., 30%+ drivers in Poland from Ukraine\(^6\))

Over-the-road trucking costs rising from fuel

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1. IATA: Europe-Asia, Asia-North America most heavily hit by airspace closure, Based on CTKs (cargo ton kilometers) over the past 12 months; 2. Business Insider: Russia’s War on Ukraine Could Triple Ocean Shipping Rates Say Experts, 3. Freightwaves: Ship fuel spikes to historic $1,000/ton mark as war fallout worsens, 4 South China Morning Post: China-Europe rail trade set for infrastructure upgrade, with container traffic up 30 per cent, 5. CSCMP’s Supply Chain Quarterly: Logistics pros warn of business impact from Russia-Ukraine war, 6. Fortune: Russia invasion: Ukrainian emigrants leaving safety and heading to war Source: Web search; BCG analysis
War in Ukraine: Supply Chain Impact

AGENDA

Deep-dive: First view on Supply Chain Impact

- Current situation and context
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- Supply chains at risk
- Implications for leaders
Russia & Ukraine supply much of the world’s intermediate / finished steel products

Russia is lowest cost producer globally - likely to divert its exports to Asia

EU re-rollers will be particularly impacted by supply shortage due to slab reliance

US producers using Electric Arc Furnaces impacted by shortage of metallics (HBI	extsuperscript{1}, pig iron) used in high-quality production

Wind turbine towers and pipe/tube for oil & gas are examples with cost & lead time impact

Already record high steel prices (scrap, met coal, power) and could further rise due to crisis

Producers & industrial goods sector in Europe / US likely impacted

Russia & Ukraine supply much of the world’s intermediate / finished steel products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iron Metallcics</th>
<th>Net-weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBI	extsuperscript{1}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Trade</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Imports</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11Mt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Mt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Trade</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Imports</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14Mt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2Mt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Imports</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<td>4Mt</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semis &amp; finished</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slabs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Trade</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Imports</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23Mt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6Mt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Plate</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Trade</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Imports</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<tr>
<td>27Mt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5Mt</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Hot Briquetted Iron, has production benefits when used in Electric Arc Furnace (EAF)  
2. Estimated using extra-regional trade as a proxy  
Note: Trade data from 2020; Based on HS6 level  
Source: UN Comtrade, BCG Analysis, Web search
Semiconductors | Already short global supply further exacerbated by raw material shortages will continue to impact auto and consumer electronics

Large demand-supply imbalance already before the Ukraine crisis

Demand¹ and supply² for semiconductors (pre-Ukraine crisis view³); Index base = Quarterly 2018 average

Once existing stocks of required gases are depleted, a continued shortage of semiconductors expected until alternate suppliers found

Gases are critical consumable for semiconductor production – e.g., Neon required for manufacturing of advanced chips

If crisis continues, lower gas availability (especially Neon) could further deepen chip shortage and thereby reduce availability

Sectors using advanced chips (e.g., cell phones, computers, etc.) impacted most

Auto, industrial and other sectors also impacted, as shortage on gases reduce semiconductor production yields

Situation likely transient, as new gas production scheduled to be available over next 6-12 months (in Germany, Singapore, Japan)

1. Historical and projected sales; forecasts derived from projected demand evolution of selected end-industries. 2. Historical and projected production; 3. BCG IC Model Forecast

Note: Drop in semiconductor demand due to sanctions will not provide a meaningful demand reduction, as Russia represent a small share of global semiconductor demand

Source: BCG IC Model Forecast, BCG analysis, Factiva, Expert inputs
Auto | Challenges in sourcing multiple impacted components in near-term, creating risk of exacerbating existing supply shortfalls

Risks to key inputs with limited alternatives already impacting vehicle manufacturing …

Selected examples

Manufacturers of wire harnesses and other auto parts (Leoni, Sumitomo etc.) closed plants

German and Korean OEMs have stopped production due to lack of cables

OEMs have halted car production despite large capacity

With only 5% of local production exported, impact will be local & limited

Effect

Rising palladium & platinum prices: limit OEM production of ICE cars (due to catalytic converter application) meeting ESG regulations, potential to stimulate EV adoption

Transient impact from neon disruption: Microchip manufacturers securing new supplies; gas producers installing new plants

Shortages of wires/cables likely transient: Companies rerouting production/supply from tier 1 & 2 suppliers in Ukraine

Nickel shortages will increase cost of EV batteries in the short-term, but impact unlikely to be long-term as newly developed Nickel-free batteries will help mitigate the shortage risk

… with other challenges that have potential to reduce output

Note: Ukraine also producer of other auto parts such as seat covers, injections molding parts, but contribution to global production negligible. CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States; % of global supply in MT for raw materials and in M$ for Wires/cables; Low: <5%, Moderate: 5-10%, High: >25%, Moderate 1. WSJ (02/27) 2. Barrons 3. IHS Markit


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Agribusiness | Constrained supply of fertilizer will impact crop productions and increase prices for a variety of food goods

Supply constraints will lead to higher industry costs and shortages

Crop production will decrease through ’23 from Ukraine supply loss & fertilizer supply constraints

Higher animal product prices through ’23 due to higher feed cost

Most food goods to see higher prices as supply tightens adding to already high food inflation

Unclear impact on agriculture inputs (machinery and equipment)

Food insecurity to increase especially in Global South, Middle East, & North Africa

Will exacerbate existing supply issues incl. the South American drought & shipping congestion

Price rise of wider commodities due to second-order impact

Price Mar 9, 2022 vs EOY 2021

- Soybeans: Primarily animal feed that substitutes for sunflower meal, +27%
- Milk: Animal products already impacted by higher feed cost, +22%
- Palm Oil: Cooking/frying oil impacted by reduced sunflower oil supply, +48%
- Rice: Grain impacted by high fertilizer cost & reduced grain supply, +6%

1. MOP = Muriate of Potassium, DAP = Diammonium Phosphate, N = Nitrogen
2. Business Insider Commodities Tracker; end of day March 9, 2022

Deep-dive: First view on Supply Chain Impact

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Implications for leaders
Companies taking immediate, short-term actions to mitigate rapidly evolving supply chain risks...

How companies are responding today

**RECONFIGURE SUPPLY CHAIN**

- **Aptiv**
  - Pre-emptively moved production of certain high-volume parts out of Ukraine in Jan 2022

- **Nippon Steel**
  - Considering sources in Brazil & Australia for 14% of iron-ore pellets sourced from Russia/Ukraine

- **Boeing**
  - Built globally sourced inventory of titanium to wind down relationship with Russia

**RESPOND RAPIDLY TO DISRUPTION**

- **Orchestrating beyond company**
  - **Nokian Tyres**
    - Have intensified risk-mgmt scenario planning to include availability planning

- **E2E risk management**
  - **Nestle**
    - Executing business continuity procedures in Ukraine to ensure supply to consumers

- **Simulation & scenarios**
  - **Coca-Cola**
    - Performed scenario planning to prepare for potential supply chain disruption

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How companies can build supply chain resilience in the medium to long term

**RECONFIGURE SUPPLY CHAIN**

- Redesign global network
- Reset buffers
- Proactive supplier management

**RESPOND RAPIDLY TO DISRUPTION**

- Orchestrate beyond company
- E2E risk management
- Simulation & scenarios

- Segment stock levels of intermediate goods and carry based on risk and criticality not only demand
- Invest in key suppliers, form "open book" partnerships
- Create partnerships in industry or buyer groups to advocate for supplier resilience & transparency
- Link cyber risk of suppliers to own SC risk mitigation efforts
- Establish network level "digital twins" to scenarios

Redesign manufacturing and sourcing network to **reduce single-sourced items**, or sourcing from one region

Invest in key suppliers, form "open book" partnerships

Create partnerships in industry or buyer groups to advocate for supplier resilience & transparency

Link cyber risk of suppliers to own SC risk mitigation efforts

Explore multi-echelon SC transparency, to better map upstream risk

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Source: Web search; BCG analysis
This is a rapidly evolving situation, and other emerging global risks will change how companies – and their supply chains – need to respond.

Thus far, markets & companies have responded mainly to the immediate and direct results of the war.

The impact of the war on commodities, companies, and industries will evolve over time, and may have more complex second order effects that leaders will need to navigate.

Some examples of these potential effects which can complicate the picture include:

- Risk of recession and resulting softening of demand
- Longer duration or wider spread of conflict
- Escalation of sanctions and/or export bans
- Enduring elevated energy costs – as a cost input

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