
BCG



War in Ukraine: Global update and first view on Supply Chain Impact

BCG Global Advantage and Operations Practice Areas

Prepared: 10 March 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution

Introduction to this document

The war in Ukraine is above all a political and humanitarian crisis...

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has led to a serious **humanitarian crisis**. BCG condemns this attack and the violence that is killing, wounding, and displacing so many people.

The top priority in moments like these must be the **safety and security of people**. Corporates, governments, and non-for-profit organizations should focus on supporting the people in Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and globally affected (physically and mentally).

... but it is driving disruption across global supply chains


It is the duty of political, societal, and business leaders to navigate through this crisis. **The intent** of this document is to inform discussions and decisions on the <u>global economic impact</u> as well as the <u>supply chain and procurement</u> impact of the war in Ukraine.

The situation surrounding Ukraine is dynamic and rapidly evolving - this document reflects information and analysis as of **10 March 2022.** It is not intended as a prediction of future events and is shared only as a resource for BCG and client conversations.

Summary snapshot | Largest refugee crisis in Europe since 1945

2.8+ Million Refugees on the move

Ukrainian Refugees by Destination Country (M)



Significant impact across Europe and beyond

All 27 EU countries offering 'temporary protection' to UA nationals, including healthcare, accommodation and temporary work permits

Polish Government estimating refugee support costs could reach \$1.7B

Huge medium-term challenge for Europe to absorb, house, educate, skill and employ numbers on such a scale

EU providing financial support to non-members to aid with refugee costs (e.g., Moldova)

Countries further afield (e.g., Canada) offering fasttrack entry terms to Ukrainians

BCG

Summary snapshot | War in Ukraine global economic impact

| | Globa | l Growth O | Dutlook | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------------|---|---------------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|---|----------------------------------|---|
| | 20 21 Actual | World Bank 20 22 Jan'22 Forecast | Leadi 20 Marc Fore Median | ing FIs 22 ch '22 ccas ts Minimum | Strait | ts Trar Pre-War | Cargo B nsits (Ave Prev. Wk (2/23-3/1) 4.4 9.7 | g. #/day Curr. Wk | y) ² |
| Russia Euro Zone Global | 4.7% 5.3% 3.9% | 2.4% 4.2% 4.1% | -4.4% 3.3% 4.5% | -10.4% 2.2% 3.4% | U pdates s | | | | S |
| Со | | modity P | | A | EU to rUK to eRussia | educe elimina to rest | Russia ga ate Russi trict cert <i>a</i> | as impo a oil pro ain expo | s, immec orts by 2/3 oduct imp orts of Cri- ain firms e |
| Commodi | , | Jan 3 '22 79.0 | Mar 7 '22 123.2 | Change | | | 1.5 | | Corpo |
| Crude Oil (\$/bbl) Gas (\$/MWh) | | 79.0 80.4 | 227.2 | | Based on | samp | le of ~300 |) compa | |
| Coal(\$/t) | | 157.5 | 422.7 | +168% | | | | | 109 |
| Wheat (€/bu) Rapeseed (€/t) | | 240.0 728.5 | 396.5 845.0 | | | 33 | | | 103 |

+95%

+59%

Nickel (\$/t)

Palladium(\$/oz)

20,430.0

1,826.0

39,905.0

2,899.9

| Deep Sea Cargo Bosporus Straits Transits (Avg. #/day) ² Pre-War Prev. Wk Curr. Wk (Nov '21) (2/23-3/1) (3/2-8) ΔCW-PW | | | Deep Sea Cargo Port Calls (Avg. #/day) ² Pre-War Prev. Wk Curr. Wk (Nov '21) (2/23-3/1) (3/2-8) ΔCW-PW | | | Baltic Dry Index (Daily Avg) ³ Pre-War Prev. Wk Curr. Wk (Nov '21) (2/24-3/2) (3/3-9) ΔCW-F | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|---|--------------|-------------------------|--|------------------|-------------------|------------|---|-----|
| Northbound | 8.9 | 4.4 | 5.1 | | Ukraine | 4.5 | 0.6 | 0.1 | | BDI ³ | 2780 | 2101 | 2229 | 6% |
| Southbound | 9.6 | 9.7 | 5.9 | -33% | Russia | 21.7 | 22.7 | 19.3 | -15% | | \mathbb{N} | | | |
| | | | | N. A | | CMC. | | | | | $\Lambda \Lambda$ | | | |
| | | | | S | ancti | ons & | Policy | Actio | ons | | | | | |
| • EU to r | ns Russ reduce | sian O&G Russia ga | as impo | s, immed orts by 2/3 | diately 3 by enc | 1 2022 | C M | | ive # of \ | ww s | anctions (+11) | s in-place | . ⁵ (Δ since (+59) | e 3 |
| US bar EU to r UK to e Russia | ns Russ reduce elimina to rest | ian O&G | as impo a oil pro ain expo | s, immed orts by 2/2 oduct imp rts of Cri | diately 3 by end ports by tical Ma | d 2022 end 202 aterials | C M | Cumulat March) | ive # of \ | | | | | |
| US bar EU to r UK to e Russia | ns Russ reduce elimina to rest | sian O&G Russia ga ate Russia rict certa | as impo a oil pro ain expo | s, immed orts by 2/2 oduct imp rts of Cri | diately 3 by end ports by tical Ma | d 2022 end 202 aterials | C M | Cumulat March) | ive # of (+115) 1,028 | | (+11) 143 | | (+59) | |
| US bar EU to r UK to e Russia Russia | ns Russ reduce elimina to rest to seiz | ian O&G Russia ga ite Russia rict certa e assets | as impo a oil pro ain expo of certa | s, immed orts by 2/. oduct imp rts of Cri in firms o Corpo | diately 3 by enc ports by tical Ma exiting F | l 2022 end 202 aterials Russia | C M 22 | Cumulat (arch) In | ive # of V (+115) 1,028 Idividuals | s C | (+11) 143 | | (+59) | |
| US bar EU to r UK to e Russia | ns Russ reduce elimina to rest to seiz | ian O&G Russia ga ite Russia rict certa e assets | as impo a oil pro ain expo of certa | s, immed orts by 2/. oduct imp rts of Cri in firms o Corpo | diately 3 by enc ports by tical Ma exiting F | l 2022 end 202 aterials Russia | C M 22 | Cumulat (arch) In | ive # of V (+115) 1,028 Idividuals | s C | (+11) 143 | | (+59) | |
| US bar EU to r UK to e Russia Russia Based on | ns Russ reduce elimina to rest to seiz | ian O&G Russia ga ite Russia rict certa e assets | as impo a oil pro ain expo of certa) compa | s, immed orts by 2/. oduct imp rts of Cri in firms o Corpo | diately 3 by enc ports by tical Ma exiting F | d 2022 end 202 aterials Russia | C M 22 | Cumulat (arch) In | ive # of V (+115) 1,028 Idividuals | s C | (+11) 143 | | (+59) | |

1. GDP for ecasts from World Bank and Fls per Bloomberg database (7-21 Fls per forecast period) 2. Deep Sea Cargo: oil tankers MR & up, bulkcar riers Panamax & up, containerships 3,000+ TEU, VLGCs, LNG carriers 60,000+ cbm & PCTCs 6,000+ ceu Clar ksons Research (<u>https://www.clarksons.com/</u>) Clar kson Research Services Limited ("Clarksons Research"). © Clarksons Research 2021. All rights in and to Clarksons Research services, information and data ("Information") are reserved to and owned by Clarksons Research. Clarksons Research, its group companies and licensors accept no liability for any errors or omissions in any Information or for any loss or damage howsoever arising. No party may rely on any Information contained in this communication. Please also see the disclai mer at https://www.clarksons.net/Portal/disclaimer, which also applies. No fur ther distribution of any Information is permitted without Clarksons Research's prior written consent. Clarksons Research does not promote, sponsor or endors the content of this communication. 3. <u>https://www.bloomberg.com/gute/BDIY:IND;</u> Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is index of avg price paid for transport of dry bulk mat'ls across 20+ routes 4. S&P Capital IQ 5. Total sanctioned actions, incl. duplication. Source: corrective.org 6. Yale Chief Exec Leadership Inst.

Key Sanctions & Policy Actions currently in-place

Current Sanctions & Policy Actions (Key examples)

| ies | |
|----------|--|
| <u> </u> | |
| | |
| A | |
| - | |
| - | |
| E | |
| Ē | |
| | |
| | |
| Ð | |
| Ľ. | |
| sti | |
| | |
| Ð | |
| ~ | |
| ≥ | |
| | |
| | |

Russia


Large EMs

÷

 \diamond

- Co-ordinated policy/sanctions programs
- Vs. Russian entities and individuals
- Limiting Russia's access to Financial System
 E.g., denial of access to SWIFT
- Technology Export Controls
- US/UK/EU: Limiting purchases of Russian energy exports
- EU/Canada/US: Close airspace to Russian aircraft
- Canada: Drop Russia from WTO "Most Favored Nation" status
- Plan to limit exports of critical materials to certain countries (Details pending)
 - Declared intent to seize assets of firms exiting Russia
 - So far, no sanctions imposed by this group of countries
 - Have asked for hostilities to cease
- China and India abstain at UN Security Council vote
- China official statements focus on peacemaking and mediation
- Indonesia in difficult position, as 2022 G20 host

Current Sanction Actions by country and target





BCG

Company Announcements re: Russia Market per Yale School of Management tracking (as of 9 March 2022)

| | Exit | Suspend Operations | Halt shipments/ supply | Curtail access to capital | Suspend new investment or partnership |
|---------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| # ompanies | 33 | 109 | 88 | 22 | 52 |
| les | BP Announced plans to divest its 19.75% stake in Russian energy company Rosneft | Bombardier Suspended all activities/technical assistance with Russia | Rolls Royce Suspended all shipments to Russia | JP Morgan Curtailed Russian access to capital markets | Yum Brands Suspended new investments in Russia |
| Examples | Eni Communicated plans to exit Blue Stream pipeline JV with Russia Gazprom | Apple Stopped selling products and online transactions in Russia | Maersk Stopped shipping to/from Russia (exclude essential supplies) | Black Rock Restricted Russian access to capital markets | Kraft Heinz Suspended new investments, imports and exports |
| | Goldman Sachs Said it would close operations in Russia | PepsiCo Suspend operations (except essentials) | Boeing & Airbus Halted supply of aircraft parts to Russian airlines | Credit Suisse Limited Russian access to capital markets | Nestle Discontinued all new capital investments in Russia |

Definitions: Exit (Cease operations, divestment, discontinue, leave and withdraw business from Russia). Suspend Operations (Suspend activities, JV, sale points, manufacture in Russia). Halt Shipments/Supply (Temporarily stop / freeze sales and transportation of goods/ services in, to and from Russia). Curtail access to capital (Financial Institutions(FI) restrict, re duce, cut, suspend, Russian access to capital provided by financial institutions). Suspend New Investments or Partnerships (Stop any new investments in Russia and suspend current sponsorships for Russian Athletes).

As of March 10th, ~300 companies have announced a complete or partial withdrawal from Russia, based on news & press search

Corporate Actions

Key immediate impacts of the war on companies




Supply chain disruption

Russia and Ukraine are key exporters for **agriculture**, **metals**, **energy**

EU more exposed than US, and has more leverage in trade sanctions

Crisis creates **key choke points across supply chain**



Commodity price volatility

Clear **price spike in gas** and agricultural commodities

Crisis **exacerbates already high energy prices** and volatility

| • • | • | - - / |) |
|-----|---|-------------|---|

Sanctions & Doing Business risks

US, UK, EU, Canada take **strong stance**

Large Emerging Markets take more nuanced approach

Sanctions will also have 2nd/3rd order impacts

Financial Services is the most affected sector

Russia is also applying **counter measures** (e.g., restriction on liquidations)




Sales & Service risk

Sales in Russia will be challenging or even prohibited by Western Sanctions

Global consumer brands will be affected by sales, service and reputational risk in Russia

Import streams for industrial goods will be impacted Russia, Ukraine and Belarus make up a small percentage of global trade but have an over indexed share of trade in Europe specifically



BCG

Overview: Several major sectors impacted, with many supply chains at risk

Before war in Ukraine, global supply chains were under stress from COVID and geo-political events (e.g., Brexit, tariffs, etc.)

Supply and cost impacts (p.10-12)

Commodity shortages

Difficulty sourcing and/or higher prices for key commodities

Component/product sourcing challenges

Inability to source manufactured goods and inputs due to plant closure

Demand shocks

Slowdown in manufacturing / inability to import impacting exporters Rise of logistics costs due to capacity and fuel impact

Logistics

Supply chains at risk (p.13-16) Supply Chains impact varies across sectors. A few examples emerge:
Steel: Supply risks in Europe due to disruptions of intermediate and finished steel products (e.g., pig iron, slabs)
Semiconductors: Short supply especially of advanced chips exacerbated – main impact auto, industrial, electronics
Automotive: Disruption of raw materials and component inputs -- accelerate inventory shortages and rising global prices
Agribusiness: Shortages (e.g. wheat, fertilizer) and increased transport costs likely to drive up commodity and food-goods prices

Implications for leaders (p.17-18) Short-term: Understand risks & impact, prioritize customers to protect; find alternative sources, rebalance global network

Mid-to-long term: Build in resilience & anticipate areas of exposure, elevate supply chain risk to C-suite, optimize global footprint, dual source, re-set supply chain buffers

Prepared: 10 March 2022 - Confidential: Limited Distribution



Raw Materials Steel, Auto and Agribusiness most impacted due to current or potential unavailability of supply from Russia and Ukraine



Note: Trade data from 2019; Based on HS6 levelexcept for Nickel at HS4 level (7501,7502) Filtered for products w/export value >\$1B; Where novalue for BY or UA; <1% of global exports 1. Analysis based on HS6 codes: 270111, 720110, 284420, 720711,711021, 310520, 750210, 760110, 310420, 271121, 100199; 2. And its compounds 3. Mineral or chemical fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorous, potassium; Russia indicated they might halt exports; 4. Excludes impact of indirect sanctions i.e., on financing, transport, and sanctions on individuals 5. Hs4 level data (7501,7502) 6. Titanium on HS4 level (8108), OEC data 7. In gaseous state Source: USGS, FAO, UN Comtrade, EIA, OEC World, BCG Analysis, Web search



Component sourcing & demand shocks Supply and demand ripple effects created by companies stopping or limiting Russian & Ukrainian operations

Companies across industries stopping or limiting operations for component shortages or to protect personnel...



Foreign OEMs (e.g., Hyundai¹, VW², Ford³) halting car production, import/ export and servicing in Russian operations

Leoni AG⁴, Kromberg & Schubert⁵ and other global tier 1 & 2 suppliers closed Ukrainian plants (manufacturing in wire harnesses)



Consumer goods companies (e.g., Heineken⁶, Carlsberg⁷, Unilever⁸, Pernod Ricard⁹) suspended exports to Russia and/or Russian production

Consumer goods companies (e.g., AB InBeV¹⁰, Coca-Cola¹¹) shutdown beverage production in Ukraine



BASF¹² halted investment in new business and operations in Russia, except for production related to humanitarian efforts

Biosphere¹³ cut production of personal care products & biodegradable plastics in Ukraine



Airbus¹⁴ suspended support services & supply of spare parts to Russian airlines; **Boeing¹⁵** stopped procuring titanium from Russia

Boeing¹⁵ temporarily closed Kyiv office employing ~1000 engineers

...with two main effects for global supply chains

Negative demand shock on manufacturing inputs exported to Russia/Ukraine. Will cause lost sales for some suppliers and create sourcing opportunities for manufacturers outside of Russia/Ukraine

Lack of supply of key components and products for companies importing from Russia/Ukraine, impacting those importers' ability to satisfy their customers' demand

<u>KBS World</u> (03/09) 2. <u>WSJ</u> (03/03) 3. <u>Reuters</u> (03/01) 4. <u>WSJ</u> (02/27) 5. <u>Reuters</u> (03/03) 6. <u>NL Times</u> (03/05) 7. <u>Reuters</u> (03/04) 8. <u>Reuters</u> (03/08) 9. <u>The Times</u> (03/07) 10. <u>Fortune</u> 11. <u>Reuters</u> (02/24) 12. <u>Nasdaq</u> (03/03)
 <u>"Effective</u> immediately, BASF will only conduct business in Russia and Belarus that fulfils existing obligations in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and international rules.", 13. <u>Forbes</u> (03/06) 14. <u>BBC</u> (03/02)
 <u>Reuters</u> (03/07) Source: Press, web search, company announcements, BCG Analysis

Prepared: 10 March 2022 - Confidential: Limited Distribution

Logistics Global freight routes further distressed leading to reduced capacity and increased costs across industries



AIR FREIGHT: Rates approaching record highs (120% above pre-COVID)¹

Flight bans and sanctions to cause **capacity loss** in EU-Asia lane (21% of cargo) exacerbating capacity crunch. Portion will cancel vs re-route

Super-connector airlines in the **Middle East** may serve as a substitute¹

Jet fuel prices up 27% month over month¹, likely to drive cargo rates up further

SEA FREIGHT: Moderate impact on capacity, significant risk from fuel

Congestion expected at northern EU ports

to process 200 rerouted ships waiting to cross the Kerch Strait²

Maersk, ONE, MSC, Hapag-Lloyd have suspended shipments to Russia & Ukraine²

Bunker (marine fuel) up 84% vs. last year³, bunker is ~45% of vessel op costs; however, rates currently detached from container rates



ROAD & RAIL: China-EU railroad stopped & EU truck drivers shortages heightened

Disrupted China-EU railway - linking 24 countries & 264 cities, and intended alternative to global sea and air freight⁴

Rail lines through Russia closed: Asian exporters need to find new routes to EU⁵

Ukrainian truck drivers returning to the Ukraine exacerbating EU driver shortage (e.g., 30%+ drivers in Poland from Ukraine⁶)

Over-the-road trucking costs rising from fuel


1. IATA: Europe-Asia, Asia-North America most heavily hit by airspace closure, Based on CTKs (cargo ton kilometers) over the past 12 months; 2. Business Insider: Russia's War on Ukraine Could Triple Ocean Shipping Rates Say Experts, 3. Freightwaves: Ship fuel spikes to historic \$1,000/ton mark as war fallout worsens, 4 South China Morning Post: China-Europe rail trade set for infrastructure upgrade, with container traffic up 30 per cent, 5. CSCMP's Supply Chain Quarterly: Logistics pros warn of business impact from Russia-Ukraine war, 6. Fortune: Russia invasion: Ukrainian emigrants leaving safety and heading to war Source: Web search; BCG analysis




Steel Supply risks – especially among European re-rollers – due to disruption of intermediate and finished steel products

Access to Cost for Demand Access to mg commodities commodities Shocks components

Russia & Ukraine supply much of world's intermediate / finished steel products





Difficulty in finding alternatives

Producers & industrial goods sector in Europe / US likely impacted

Russia is lowest cost producer globally - **likely** to divert its exports to Asia

EU re-rollers will be particularly impacted by supply shortage due to slab reliance

US producers using Electric Arc Furnaces impacted by shortage of metallics (HBI¹, pig iron) used in high-quality production


Wind turbine towers and pipe/tube for oil & gas are examples with cost & lead time impact

Already **record high steel prices** (scrap, met coal, power) and could further rise due to crisis


Convrieht © 2022 by Boston Consulting Group. All rig

Semiconductors Already short global supply further exacerbated by raw material shortages will continue to impact auto and consumer electronics

Large demand-supply imbalance already before the Ukraine crisis



Once existing stocks of required gases are depleted, a continued shortage of semiconductors expected until alternate suppliers found



Gases are **critical consumable for semiconductor production** – e.g., Neon required for manufacturing of advanced chips

Risk Summarv

Demand

Shocks

N/A

Access to mfg

components

N/A

Cost for

commodities commodities

Access to

If crisis continues, lower gas availability (especially Neon) could **further deepen chip shortage** and thereby reduce availability

Sectors using advanced chips (e.g., **cell phones, computers, etc.)** impacted most

Auto, industrial and other sectors also impacted, as shortage on gases reduce semiconductor production yields

Situation likely transient, as new gas production scheduled to be available over next 6-12 months (in Germany, Singapore, Japan)

1. Historical and projected sales; forecasts derived from projected demand evolution of selected end-industries. 2. Historical and projected production; 3. BCG IC Model Forecast Note: Drop in semiconductor demand due to sanctions will not provide a meaningful demand reduction, as Russia represent a small share of global semiconductor demand Source: BCG IC Model Forecast, BCG analysis, Factiva, Expert inputs Prepared: 10 March 2022 – Confidential: Limited Distribution \c




ECC Auto Challenges in sourcing multiple impacted components in near-term, creating risk of exacerbating existing supply shortfalls

Risk Summary Cost for Demand Access to commodities commodities Shocks

Access to mfg components

Risks to key inputs with limited alternatives already impacting vehicle manufacturing...



... with other challenges that have potential to reduce output

Rising palladium & platinum prices:

limit OEM production of ICE cars (due to catalytic converter application) meeting ESG regulations, potential to stimulate EV adoption

Transient impact from neon disruption:

Microchip manufacturers securing new supplies; gas producers installing new plants

Shortages of wires/cables likely transient:

Companies rerouting production/supply from tier 1 & 2 suppliers in Ukraine


Nickel shortages will increase cost of EV **batteries** in the short-term, but impact unlikely to be long-term as newly developed Nickel-free batteries will help mitigate the shortage risk

Note: Ukraine also producer of other auto parts such as seat covers, injections molding parts, but contribution to global production negligible. CIS : Commonwealth of Independent States; % of global supply in MT for raw materials and in M\$ for Wires/cables; Low: < 5%, Moderate: 5-10%, High: >25%, Moderate 1. WS (02/27) 2. Barrons 3. IHS Markit Source: S&P Capital IQ, ITC Trade Map, HIS Markit, Automotive News, EPS News, BCG analysis

Prepared: 10 March 2022 - Confidential: Limited Distribution

Agribusiness Constrained supply of fertilizer will impact crop productions and increase prices for a variety of food goods

Supply constraints will lead to higher industry costs and shortages



Crop production will decrease through '23 from Ukraine supply loss & fertilizer supply constraints

Higher animal product prices through '23 due to higher feed cost

Most food goods to see higher prices as supply tightens adding to already high food inflation

Unclear impact on agriculture inputs (machinery and equipment)

Food insecurity to increase especially in Global South, Middle East, & North Africa

Will exacerbate existing supply issues incl. the South American drought & shipping congestion

Price rise of wider commodities due to second-order impact

commodities commodities

Risk Summary

Demand

Shocks

Access to mfs

Cost for

Price Mar 9, 2022 vs EOY 2021²

Access to

| So ybeans | Primarily animal feed that |
|-----------|--------------------------------|
| +27% | substitutes for sunflower meal |

Milk +22%

Animal products already impacted by higher feed cost


Cooking/frying oil impacted by Palm Oil +48% reduced sunflower oil supply

Rice +6%

Grain impacted by high fertilizer cost & reduced grain supply

ECG Companies taking immediate, short-term actions to mitigate rapidly evolving supply chain risks...


How companies are responding today



1. Reuters: Auto parts maker Aptiv recently shifted high-volume Ukraine-CEO 2. Simple Flying: Boeing Isn't Worried About A Lack Of Russian Titanium 3. Mining Technology: Russia-Ukraine crisis hits Arcelor Mittal and Nippon Steel 4. Reuters: Nestle says operations running normally in Ukraine, continuity plans in place 5. Reuters: Nokian Tyres moves some production and stock out of Russia 6. Reuters: London-listed Coca-Cola HBC readies Russia contingencies as profits rise Source: Web search; BCG analysis

... and should build capabilities over the medium and long-term to build resilience for future disruptions

How companies can build supply chain resilience in the medium to long term



Teams across BCG are monitoring impact

Global Advantage Practice Area



Nikolaus Lang

Practice Area Leader, Global Advantage Managing Director & Senior Partner E: <u>Lang.Nikolaus@bcg.com</u>



Marc Gilbert Managing Director & Senior Partner Global Lead, Geopolitics & Trade Impact E: <u>Gilbert.Marc@bcg.com</u>

Michael McAdoo Partner & Director, Global Trade & Investment E: <u>McAdoo.Michael@bcg.com</u>



Kasey Maggard Global Practice Management Director E: <u>Maggard.Kasey@bcg.com</u>

Operations Practice Area



Ravi Srivastava

Global Leader, Operations Practice Managing Director & Senior Partner E: <u>Srivastava.Ravi@BCG.com</u>



Dustin Burke

Managing Director & Partner Global Co-lead, Manufacturing and Supply Chain E: <u>Burke.Dustin@bcg.com</u>

Daniel Weise

Managing Director & Partner Global Lead, Procurement E: <u>Weise.Daniel@bcg.com</u>



Ayisha Corey Associate Director E: <u>Corey. Ayisha@bcg.com</u>

Disclaimer

The services and materials provided by Boston Consulting Group (BCG) are subject to BCG's Standard Terms (a copy of which is available upon request) or such other agreement as may have been previously executed by BCG. BCG does not provide legal, accounting, or tax advice. The Client is responsible for obtaining independent advice concerning these matters. This advice may affect the guidance given by BCG. Further, BCG has made no undertaking to update these materials after the date hereof, notwithstanding thats uch information may become outdated or inaccurate.

The materials contained in this presentation are designed for the sole use by the board of directors or senior management of the Client and solely for the limited purposes described in the presentation. The materials shall not be copied or given to any person or entity other than the Client ("Third Party") without the prior written consent of BCG. These materials serve only as the focus for discussion; they are incomplete without the accompanying oral commentary and may not be relied on as a stand-alone document. Further, Third Parties may not, and it is unreasonable for any Third Party to, rely on these materials for any purpose whats œver. To the fullest extent permitted by law (and except to the extent otherwise agreed in a signed writing by BCG), BCG shall have no liability whats œver to any Third Party, and any Third Party hereby waives any rights and claims it may have at any time against BCG with regard to the services, this presentation, or other materials, including the accuracy or completeness thereof. Receipt and review of this document shall be deemed agreement with and consideration for the foregoing.

BCG does not provide fairness opinions or valuations of market trans actions, and these materials should not be relied on or construed as such. Further, the financial evaluations, projected market and financial information, and conclusions contained in these materials are based upon standard valuation methodologies, are not definitive forecasts, and are not guaranteed by BCG. BCG has used public and/or confidential data and assumptions provided to BCG by the Client. BCG has not independently verified the data and assumptions used in these analyses. Changes in the underlying data or operating assumptions will clearly impact the analyses and conclusions.